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Minds, causes, and mechanisms, by Josep Corbı´ and
Josep Prades, is a thoughtful critique of a widely
held picture of causation and the way it gives rise
to familiar puzzles about mental causation. Since
the victory of materialist metaphysics in mid-cen-
tury, philosophers of mind have struggled to find a
picture of the mental that fits comfortably into a
world understood as fundamentally physical. Giv-
ing a satisfactory explanation of the causal efficacy
of mental phenomena like belief and desire is, and
has always been, the most difficult part of this
enterprise. No charge in philosophy of mind has
carried greater sting than “epiphenomenalism,”
and yet it has been hard to see how an account of
the mental which demands no more of the uni-
verse than is required to explain its non-mental
aspects could vindicate the causal efficacy de-
manded by our conception of the mental. If there
is no more to my desire, in some sense of “no
more,” than its physical basis, then how can my
desire have any effects which are not already fully
explained and accounted for by the effects of its
purely physical underpinnings? The narrow path
philosophers of mind must walk has been clear:
give an account of the mental which squares its
distinctive contribution to causal explanation with
our physicalist presuppositions.
This stricture appears to permit only two
strategies. Either one can claim that mental phe-
nomena really just are physical phenomena, de-
scribed in a different vocabulary, or one can try to
make out a sense in which mental phenomena are
distinct from physical phenomena but wholly de-
pendent upon them. Donald Davidson’s anoma-
lous monism is the premiere example of the for-
mer strategy, while a variety of functionalist
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accounts vie for the title of “our most promising
non-reductive account of the mental.” Prima facie,
both strategies appear to deliver the goods. David-
son’s mental events just are physical events, gov-
erned by the same laws which govern the rest of
the non-mental universe, while the explanatory
power of functional states is wholly grounded by
their realizing mechanisms in each particular case.
In recent years, however, even such tailor-made
solutions to the puzzle have been subject to criti-
cisms that they do not, after all, provide a satisfac-
tory causal role for the mental. On the one hand,
the mental properties of Davidson’s events seem
causally irrelevant to their effects. On the other
hand, functionalism has been subject to the twin
charges (1) that the explanatory powers of func-
tional characterizations are not only wholly
grounded in but also wholly exhausted by that of
their realizing mechanisms, and (2) that a func-
tionalist account of contentful mental states re-
quires a notion of narrow content to afford them
genuine causal efficacy and that such a notion is
unavailable. Whether or not these worries can be
assuaged, it is clear that the problem of mental
causation continues to dog the philosophy of mind
as it has since Gassendi’s critique of Descartes’
interactionism.
While much recent literature is devoted to
making good on these strategies, Corbı´ and Prades
pursue a time-honored philosophical alternative:
when a puzzle seems intractable, reexamine the
assumptions which gave rise to it in the first place
and argue that the puzzle is illusory. Motivated by
the critiques of functionalism and monism, their
target is what they call “causal physicalism,” the
familiar assumption that any genuine case of cau-
sation (mental, functional, etc.) must, on each
occasion, be entirely dependent on the causal
efficacy of some basic, physical properties. As
proxies for this broad idea, Corbı´ and Prades
identify three principles to which they believe the
causal physicalist is committed: (1) intrinsicness,
that two objects alike in their intrinsic properties
share their causal powers in all contexts, (2) nar-
rowness, that each causally efficacious non-intrin-
sic property must have a narrow correlate, and (3)
minimality, that causally efficacious non-basic
properties must supervene on a single, minimal
collection of basic properties, all of which are
necessary for the non-basic property’s instantia-
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tion. They argue that all three principles are either
false or can only be secured at unacceptable cost,
such as ruling out the possibility of multiple real-
ization for non-basic properties or requiring mass-
ive overdetermination of effects by causes. Their
goal is to show the incoherence of causal physical-
ism and thus to expose it as a fraudulent standard
for the causal efficaciousness of non-basic proper-
ties. Their criticisms also lead them to sketch, in
the broadest terms, a more acceptable standard,
one which it turns out mental properties have no
trouble meeting.
The philosophical perspective Corbı´ and
Prades bring to bear on these issues stems largely
from a concern with the role of context in individ-
uating the properties suitable for nomic general-
ization. They are among those who argue that the
individuation of functional properties, and indeed
of any properties which support nomic generaliza-
tion and recognizably causal counterfactuals, pro-
ceeds ineliminably with reference to normal, ac-
tual conditions. In contrast, they maintain that
causal physicalism requires an uncontextualized
understanding of the way in which the causal
powers of an object are a function of its intrinsic
properties and the contexts in which it is placed,
what they call a “metadisposition.” They argue
that such an understanding is unavailable in prin-
ciple because any attempt to enumerate the
properties of objects and contexts in a way which
necessitates the effects fails, for there is always the
possibility of additional contextual properties
which would defeat the effect. The only way we,
or even an omniscient being, could characterize
genuine causal connections involves a perspective-
bound approach and the way it eliminates deviant
contexts from consideration. This argument forms
the lynchpin of their critiques of standard ap-
proaches to understanding both strict and ceteris
paribus laws.
In such a radically contextualist philosophical
setting, the target principles struggle. Intrinsicness
fails because intrinsic twins can have different
causal powers in different contexts, even though
one would have had the powers of the other in the
same context. With intrinsicness goes strong su-
pervenience, to be replaced by a weaker, “normal”
supervenience claim, one restricted to spatio-tem-
poral regions fit to provide the appropriate normal
background conditions for individuation. Narrow-
ness turns out to be incompatible with multiple
realization because only exact physical duplicates
share all their powers across all nomologically
possible contexts, while the more generous indi-
viduatory practices offered by anchoring in normal
and actual context vitiates their narrowness. Mini-
mality runs afoul of strictures against overdetermi-
nation, as for any functional property, they claim
one can pick out many compresent collections of
properties, each of which suffices for instantiation
of the functional property, and all of which com-
pete to be the cause of the effect. With minimality
goes the idea that every effect has a unique, com-
plete physical explanation. In the broadest terms,
Corbı´ and Prades aim to undermine the im-
pression that the description of the world at the
level of basic physical properties and strict nomic
connections between them is a privileged one be-
cause describable from an absolute, uncontextual-
ized perspective. The seemingly imperfect, per-
spectival understanding of functional, mental, and
other non-basic properties and causal connections
between them turns out to be the best understand-
ing available for basic properties as well. Without
this asymmetry, reasons for impugning the causal
efficacy of the non-basic properties are said to
vanish.
There are a number of points where readers
may plausibly disagree with their reasoning or
their formulation of what are supposed to be stan-
dard views. For example, their central argument
against the availability of metadispositions appears
not to take seriously the idea that principles which
individuate functional properties should have the
form of equivalence principles, a thought which
should help insulate against the worry of contexts
containing defeating properties. What they label
“equivalence principles” are manifestly not such.
So too is there a certain casualness with the notion
of overdetermination. While they are explicitly
aware that it is only independent causal chains
which are meant to be ruled out, one worries
whether their putative examples of overdetermina-
tion involve truly independent causal chains, es-
pecially when it comes to examples intended to
undermine the minimality principle. Finally, while
they often explicitly address the thought that these
worries about context and individuation are
merely epistemic, they are not fully successful in
defusing them.
Minds, causes, and mechanisms is a difficult
book. Much of this is due to the inherent com-
plexity of the subject matter, but some is due to
their prose. Although Corbı´ and Prades do a good
job of taking the reader through the terrain of
recent philosophy of causation and mind (absent,
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strangely, the influence of behaviorism) and regu-
larly flag the structure of their arguments, the
reader must often work hard to extract their rea-
soning, follow the flow of their thought, and dis-
cern the workings of their examples. The positive
views to which their critique leads them are pre-
sented relatively briefly and it is hard to make out
what they take the wider consequences of such an
unorthodox view to be.
Corbı´ and Prades are engaged in a worthwhile
project. The deepest presuppositions that frame
debates on mental causation are too seldom
dragged out into the light for questioning, and
their critiques offer an opportunity to reassess
much of what we often take for granted. They are
aware that many of their claims will seem radical
and work hard to give the reader a sense that there
really are hard questions and puzzles where most
see only obvious truths. They also perform a ser-
vice in bringing to bear an underappreciated set of
concerns—the interaction of context with individ-
uation and causal explanation—which have not
hitherto played a large role in the philosophy of
mind literature. The problem of mental causation
has remained intractable long enough for us to
welcome any effort to reassess the ground rules
which have persistently frustrated our hopes to
find the mental a home in the physical world.
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When philosopher Rafael Nu´n˜ez and neuroscien-
tist Walter Freeman decided to name their recent
collection Reclaiming cognition, they were quite
clearly inviting a question: from whom does cogni-
tion need to be reclaimed? The answer to this
implied question will be unsurprising to those who
have followed recent debates in cognitive science.
Cognition, Nu´n˜ez and Freeman suggest, needs to
be reclaimed from computational cognitive scien-
tists, who claim thought is computation and who
have been claiming for years that theirs is the only
game in town.
The purpose of this collection to show that
there are other games in town. The contributions
are mostly from the outskirts of cognitive science,
anti-computationalist radicals looking to pick a
fight. Computational cognitive scientists raised on
the milk of Chomsky and Fodor will find these
essays frustrating for many reasons, among which
are the following:
1. Computational cognitive scientists are
mocked as “technocrats and analysts.”
2. Computationalist research is not taken es-
pecially seriously, and is criticized from a
feminist perspective.
3. Everything worthwhile is “embodied” or
“situated” or “embedded,” and computa-
tional cognitive science is not “embodied” or
“situated” or “embedded.”
4. Along with the usual anti-computationalist
suspects (Gibson, dynamical systems theory,
Heidegger and Husserl), Freud, Marx and
Irigiray are favorably discussed.
Despite these rhetorical excesses, even an unfortu-
nate use of the word “languaging,” this collection
has a lot going for it, and is deserving of a wide
readership. Indeed, I will suggest that this is a
book that the computational cognitive scientists
especially really should read.
The supposed problem with computational-
ism, as anyone following current debates will have
heard, is in its failure to address embodiment. The
essay by Nu´n˜ez describes three deepening levels of
embodiment to which a theory of cognition might
be committed. First there is trivial embodiment,
which is simply the claim that thinking requires a
brain. Everyone, even computationalists, believes
this nowadays. The second level of commitment is
to material embodiment. Commitment to material
embodiment is commitment to trivial embodi-
ments plus two more claims. First, cognition is
decentralized. Second, cognition is constrained by
the fact that it must be performed by an animal in
real-time, with a brain like ours, in a body like
ours, in a complex environment. In research on
material embodiment, the focus is typically on
low-level, not paradigmatically cognitive tasks
such as motor control or feature detection. Fi-
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nally, there is what Nu´n˜ez calls full embodiment,
which is the claim that all of our abilities are
embodied in the second sense. That is, concepts,
creativity, poetry, and the like also cannot be
understood other than in terms of brains, bodies,
and real-time actions in complex environments.
Indeed, the thought is that this embodiment is the
raw material for all of our “higher-level” abilities.
Thus, the problem with computational cogni-
tive science from the point of view of the authors
of the essays here is that computationalists are
typically committed to just trivial embodiment,
when cognition itself is fully embodied. Indeed,
even the most computationalist-friendly thing
here, the chapter by Andy Clark, adopts a com-
mitment to full embodiment. Clark calls for a
reconciliation of computationalism and fully em-
bodied cognitive science. He suggests that we can
take embodiment seriously, and still hold on the
idea that cognition is computation by realizing
that all mental representations, even those on
which complicated computations are performed,
are action-oriented. Clark is of course rarely con-
sidered a friend of the good old fashioned compu-
tational cognitive science, but in this collection, he
seems stodgy, a reformer among revolutionaries.
Most authors in the collection want no reconcili-
ation, and argue that computationalism must be
overthrown once and for all.
So, according to the contributors to this col-
lection, cognition is to be reclaimed by practi-
tioners of a non-computationalist, fully embodied
cognitive science. But apart from the typically
mocking rejection of computationalism and the
commitment to full embodiment, is there anything
like a unified story lurking in here? That is, is there
one other game in town with sufficient explanatory
power to be a competitor to computationalism?
This collection is a mixed bag, but if you’re selec-
tive, you can cobble together such a story. Doing
so, however, requires ignoring several contribu-
tions, some of them very good, concerning topics
such as logic (Longo), quantum mechanics (Go-
matam), phenomenology (Goodwin, Sheets-John-
stone), and feminism (Rose). This is not intended
to disparage these essays, which include some of
my favorites of the collection, especially Hillary
Rose’s insightful, if ultimately self-contradictory,
feminist critique of the current obsessions over
consciousness.
What follows is an attempt at cobbling to-
gether such a unified story, which I will call “fully
embodied cognition” (FEC). Start with the stan-
dard dynamicist view (see the essays collected in
Port and van Gelder, 1995) that the brain, body,
and environment are complex dynamical systems
that are so tightly coupled as to be inexplicable as
separate entities. Understanding the mind, the
task of cognitive science or any scientific psy-
chology, just is the understanding the interactions
of these dynamic systems (Cisek, Iverson & The-
len, Turvey & Shaw, Shaw & Turvey; Hardcastle,
echoing Griffiths, 1997, suggests that emotions
should also be understood dynamically, at least
developmentally). The activity of the brain is also
to be understood as a dynamical system, to be
explained using the mathematical tools of dynami-
cal systems theory (Freeman, Nicolis & Tsuda,
Cisek). Its main task is to act as the controller for
the body in the environment (Cisek).
This coupling (brain-body-environment)
determines the content of many or most of our
perceptions and thoughts. The most basic cases
of perception are action-oriented, and the percepts
are affordances (Gibson, 1979) or opportunities
for activity. Furthermore, much of our action
is what Edward Reed (1996) called exploratory
action, action designed to facilitate more felici-
tous perception (Cisek, Clark, Turvey & Shaw,
Shaw & Turvey). There is, according to this
view, a very tight coupling between perception and
action: (some? most?) perception is action-
oriented and (some? most?) action is perception-
oriented.
Of course, not all of human thought is action-
oriented. To explain paradigmatically cognitive
activities like planning and doing math, activities
in which we are in one way or another decoupled
from the environment, FEC invokes concepts.
First, because we are dealing with a story that
focuses on the primacy of embodied action, con-
cepts will be action- and body-based (Nu´n˜ez) in a
way that is familiar to readers of Lakoff and John-
son (1980, 1999). More importantly and less fa-
miliarly, the job of concepts, according to this
picture, is to create and enforce an artificial separ-
ation of mind and world, to hold the world at
arm’s length briefly, imperfectly, in order to think
about it (Skarda, Rosch).
FEC is, I think, a very compelling story. Per-
haps it is even sufficiently powerful to compete
with computationalism. There are two ways in
which this story is striking. The first is that FEC
reflects the ongoing renewal of interest in Gibso-
nian ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979) in cog-
nitive science circles. (Note however that
BOOK REVIEWS 169
ecological psychology has been around and thriv-
ing for quite some time; it’s just that cognitive
scientists are coming back around to it.) The se-
cond thing that’s striking about it is that FEC is
very nearly identical to Brian Cantwell Smith’s
theory of registration (1996), a theory of represen-
tation cum ontology designed to account for in-
tentionality in both humans and machines.
The similarity between FEC and Smith’s the-
ory of registration points to the reason that this
collection ought to be of interest to the computa-
tionalists from whom it aims to reclaim cognition.
Smith, a lapsed computationalist, suggests that the
theory of registration follows from careful years of
research on computation and attempts to carefully
spell out the computationalist hypothesis that the
mind is a computer. That is, if one tries really hard
to do non-embodied cognitive science, one ends
up concluding that the account of cognition one
can cobble together from Reclaiming cognition is
correct. Perhaps, then, computationalists will end
up here after all. They could save time by reading
this collection sympathetically, along with Gibson
(1979) and Smith (1996).
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In this quirky, contradictory book, Dodwell sets
out to “mount an even more radical challenge to
the standard model [of explanation in cognitive
science] than Penrose” (p. 81). But he also says
that his “goal is not to attempt to demolish the
standard model, but rather to raise the level of
awareness of the consequences of holding it”
(p. 106). Dodwell talks about the clockwork na-
ture of the standard model, and says that it cannot
explain cognition (which he calls “mentation”),
but he also says that he “does not seek to under-
mine the achievements of cognitive science, only
to put them in proper perspective” (p. 195). He
says that cognitive scientists and practitioners of
artificial intelligence (AI) focus on “the world of
material objects and processes, where physical law
holds sway” (p. 155), but then says that AI practi-
tioners focus on the software, which they liken to
mind. He argues for the independence of levels of
explanation and endorses what he calls the “Peters
principle”—that “no statement of psychological
import can be deduced from premises that them-
selves have no psychological reference” (p. 191).
Thus, the mental cannot be explained in terms of
the physical. Initially, Dodwell says that it can
only be explained in terms of the mental, but later
says that it should be explained in terms of objec-
tive knowledge and ideals. This, however, violates
the Peters principle.
The structure of the book is as follows. Chap-
ter 1 says that philosophers of cognitive science
have a widely accepted, although seldom explicitly
stated, a metaphysical position—“the metaphysics
of materialism, plain and simple” (p. 8). This is an
outdated, “clockwork” view of the world that is
essentially the science of the 1860s. Chapters 2–3
discuss the disciplines that have fed into the
“standard model” in cognitive science: experimen-
tal psychology, neuroscience, AI, linguistics, and
philosophy of mind. Chapter 4 lists the “axioms”
of this model, which “collectively define the meta-
physics of cognitive science” (p. 58). These in-
clude:
(1) mental activity is a function of brain pro-
cesses,
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(2) the physiology of the brain will eventually
be understood in terms of chemical and
physical laws, so that, ultimately, state-
ments about mental activity will be re-
ducible without remainder to statements
couched in physical terms, and
(3) the brain is a product of the natural biologi-
cal world, developed under the same evol-
utionary pressures as the rest of the body.
The “recent computational trend in cognitive sci-
ence” (p. 59) has added some widely accepted
beliefs to these axioms, including:
(4) the goal of cognitive science is to
“determine what sort of machine the brain
is” (p. 59), and
(5) theories must be explicit enough to be
“expressed in terms of efficient procedures for
implementation, i.e., as algorithms, either
in abstract, formal terms, or as simulations
on a machine” (p. 59).
Dodwell argues against this materialism using
Popper’s distinction between worlds 1, 2, and 3.
w1 is the world of physical objects and events. w2
is the world of mental contents—ideas, inner
thoughts, etc. w3 is similar to Plato’s World of
Forms, except that most of its contents are the
products of human contrivance. Following Pop-
per, Dodwell argues that w3 causally influences
w1. When we discover a proof, the proof was there
waiting to be discovered, and, once discovered, it
causally influences w1, in terms of what goes on in
brains and on paper. Moreover, it does so via w2,
by changing people’s beliefs, etc. Consequently,
w2 causally effects w1, so that it is not just an
epiphenomenon of w1. Exit materialism.
Chapter 5 argues for the independence of
levels of explanation. Dodwell distinguishes be-
tween three levels of perceptual activity: sensory
physiology, perceptual organization and aware-
ness, and cognitive use. “Each level has its own
appropriate theoretical constructs, specific models
and mechanisms of operation” (p. 98). He then
distinguishes between prediction and causation on
the one hand and explanation on the other. Tem-
perature t and pressure p will cause a snowflake of
type s to form on a nylon thread suspended in a
super-cooled vessel of water vapor. t and p cause s,
and we can predict that s will occur given t and p;
but t and p do not explain s. For this we would
need a model of molecular dynamics from which
the characteristics of the snowflake could be de-
duced. Explanations are level-specific. Infor-
mation about one level might enable us to predict
what will happen at a higher level, but cannot
explain it. Dodwell predictably applies this distinc-
tion to the mind–body problem: sound waves
striking the tympanum cause us to hear a sound,
but do not explain why we hear it, because we do
not have a theoretical mechanism that enables us
to deduce what is heard from what is going on in
the ear and brain (p. 95).
From this point onwards, I find the argument
hard to follow. Chapter 6 argues against
“monolithic theories of perception” (p. 108), of
the sort espoused by Gibson. Chapter 7 is a detour
into mathematics, aimed at showing that we can-
not understand “mathematics and how it is done”
(p. 150) by studying the brain. Chapter 8 says that
much is wrong with the standard model, including
a failure to distinguish between prediction and
explanation, and needing the categories of folk
psychology whilst believing they must be dis-
carded as pre-scientific.
Chapter 9, unfortunately called “The sacred
river,” sets out Dodwell’s alternative framework.
As far as I understand it, “the sacred river” is w3,
now construed in a way more reminiscent of
Hegel than Popper. Popper rejected Hegel’s no-
tion that w3, which Hegel called “Spirit,” evolves
under its own steam, and was at pains to stress
that most of the contents of w3 are the products of
human effort. Dodwell turns this about: “rather
than w3 being just a world of intellectual and other
cultural products, it is seen to be the progenitor?
of all that is culturally powerful and precious in
humankind. We thus come to see ourselves as the
vehicles for the expression of the entities of w3,
not—or not only—as their creators. [The human
mind is] the bearer of … ideas and ideals that are
gestated in w3 but are brought to birth out of the
flashing stream” (p. 192). All genuine psychologi-
cal explanation “thus seems to require us to enter,
to draw our ideas from, w3” (p. 192). Surpris-
ingly, Dodwell does not mention Hegel.
What are we to make of all this? First, Dod-
well’s axiomatic characterization of cognitive sci-
ence is quite strange. It is not clear where the
axioms come from. He has surveyed the disci-
plines that feed into cognitive science, but has not
derived the axioms from the survey. Nor is it clear
that the axioms are correct. What most obviously
characterizes cognitive science is its use of compu-
tational models of cognition that enable us to test
theories about what would otherwise be the “black
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box” of the mind (sometimes called
“cognitivism”). Dodwell cites it, not as an axiom,
but as a “widely accepted belief” that came about
with the “recent computational trend in cognitive
science” (p. 59). I do not think that there was any
cognitive science before cognitivism. Cognitive
science came about when different disciplines re-
alized that they were using computers (or at least
formal, algorithmic methods, as Dodwell says) to
model cognition. So is cognitivism committed to
materialism? Surely not. Cognitivism and its close
cousin, classical, symbol-handling AI, are con-
cerned with the software, not the hardware. The
software runs on silicon computers in the same
way that the mind “runs” on the carbon wetware
of the brain. It is software, or mind, that matters,
and the physical nature of the hardware is irrel-
evant, so long as the software can run on it.
Dodwell comes close to saying this when he says
“theories must be expressed in terms of efficient
procedures for implementation, i.e., as al-
gorithms,” (p. 59), and he openly admits it later
on: “Computer scientists who simulate mental
functions generally claim that it is the program
they devise that is crucial? The hardware [is] of no
theoretical importance in the sense that many dif-
ferent types of system could be made to run the
same simulation, including, for one of this per-
suasion, the ‘wetware’ of the brain” (p. 158). All
that he has to say about this is that it “should give
one pause for thought” (p. 158). Ironically, he
seems to have got his levels of description wrong.
There are other ways in which Dodson mis-
represents AI and cognitive science. He says that
cognitive science has “virtually nothing” to say
about creativity and imagination (p. 137), and that
it treats the “revelations” of the creative process
with “a shrug of the shoulders” (p. 150). This is
simply not true, for the study of creativity is a
subfield in cognitive science, with its own litera-
ture and conferences. A good introduction is Bo-
den (1990), which amongst other things outlines
the programs that have been written to model
theory formation in mathematics and the sciences.
A great deal of attention has been given to trying
to understand the apparently “revelatory” nature
of the creative process.
Let us return to Dodwell’s main attack on
cognitive science. He says that psychological ex-
planations cannot be deduced from non-psycho-
logical premises, so that we cannot explain cogni-
tion in materialistic terms. In that case, stubbing
my toe against a rock does not explain the pain in
my toe, and drinking all that whisky does not
explain why the world is spinning around, or why
I will feel dreadful in the morning. There may be
some sort of theoretical or explanatory gap be-
tween the physical stimulus and the ensuing ex-
perience. What worries me is that this causes Dod-
well to shy away from trying to explain any of our
experiences in terms of our interactions with the
world. Instead, we should limit ourselves to ex-
plaining cognition in cognitive terms (though this
is not what he actually does, as we shall see). But
how do we explain the pain without referring to the
rock, or the dizziness without referring to the al-
cohol? First, I do not see how this can be done.
Second, the natural explanation is in terms of the
rock and the alcohol. This is how our folk psy-
chology works, and Dodwell stresses the import-
ance of folk psychology, which, he says, names
and describes the cognitive phenomena we are
trying to explain. Although he is equivocal about
the relationship between folk psychology and the
standard model, he says that if the standard model
clashes with folk psychology, so much the worse
for the standard model. Equally, then, if his ac-
count of explanation clashes with folk psychology,
so much the worse for his account of explanation.
Dodwell writes that he wishes to create “a
rich and full picture of humankind” (p. 30). I
think that a rich and full picture of humankind
locates us in the physical world (one is inclined to
say, “the natural world”) that is our natural home.
It is not unreasonable to say that AI and cognitive
science have had a humanizing effect by showing
that attempts to model intelligence in terms of
disembodied symbol-handling do not succeed,
and that we need to be situated in the world to
acquire the low-level skills that underlie and drive
cognition. Ironically, symbolic AI started out with
the kind of profoundly non-biological approach to
intelligence that Dodwell seems to be advocating,
and to some extent discovered the importance of
embodiment. Dodwell’s explanation would take
us back to the disembodied approach.
When the chips are down, however, Dodwell
does not talk about explaining cognition in cogni-
tive, w2, terms. He talks about explaining it in w3
terms. Why doesn’t he think that this violates the
Peters principle? First, he moves from folk psy-
chology to what he calls its “grand embodiment—
the flower of civilisation … including the great cul-
tural achievements of the past three thousand
years” (p. 197). Second, he apparently thinks that
w3 entities are psychological because they are
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intentional. I think he is wrong about this. Some-
thing can be intentional, in the sense of “being
about something,” without being psychological or
cognitive, in the sense of “being a cognitive state”
or “being in a mind.” Consider the belief “beer is
good for you.” In one sense of “belief” this is a
psychological state that I might have and you
might not. Beliefs in this sense are the furniture of
our mental lives, and our different beliefs will to
some extent determine the psychological differ-
ences between us.
But in another sense, “beer is good for you” is
not a psychological state. It is an objective prop-
osition (we sometimes say it is the content of belief).
w3 beliefs are beliefs in this sense. They exist
independently of us, and we believe them or do
not believe them, just as we see or do not see
objects in the physical world. In this sense, beliefs
are denizens of another world, and invoking them
to explain w2 violates the Peters principle just as
much as invoking physical objects. But invoking
physical objects at least enables us to tell a causal
story about why we hear and see things. We can-
not tell such a story about the contents of w3.
They do not cause us to believe them.
Dodwell talks about the importance of ideal-
ization and admires Chomsky’s concept of the
“competence of an Ideal Speaker,” who knows its
language perfectly (he also admires MacNamara,
but does not refer to MacNamara’s concept of an
“Ideal Reasoner”). I think we need to be careful
about the role of idealization in here. Saying that
we should study language by studying the com-
petence of the Ideal Speaker gives us the im-
pression that we are studying mind and doing
psychology, when we are really only studying lan-
guage. It is like saying that we should study the
universe as God sees it—which is just another way
of saying that we should study the universe as it
really is.
I do not like to write negative reviews, but I
find it hard to be charitable in this case. Dodwell
takes forever to state his case, and it is never
entirely clear what the case is. The Peters prin-
ciple, a vital plank in his argument, is not intro-
duced until late (p. 166), and not fully stated until
even later (p. 191)—nine pages from the end of
the final chapter. As well as the inconsistencies
cited in the first paragraph, he also says “the
standard model does actually accept … folk psy-
chology” (p. 154), but it believes that folk psy-
chology “must be disregarded as ‘pre-scientific”’
(p. 166); the standard model can be reconciled
with folk psychology, but this “requires some
thought,” which he does not provide, because this
is the end of the book. He calls for a “greater
humility” and “proper modesty” in explaining
mind (p. 196), but he tends to be arrogant. In the
early chapters he repeatedly appeals to a work of
his own that is in preparation. He says that his
distinction between a cause and an explanation
goes against “a strong tradition in the philosophy
of science” (p. 91), but says, “… too bad! It is an
unfortunate tradition!” (p. 91).
There are typographical errors on the follow-
ing pages and lines: viii/20; 5/20; 9/27; 12/32;
20/4, 6; 21/27; 23/33; 27/36; 69/29; 168/30; 200/
14; 203/44; 204/42; 207/1, 3; 209/33 (twice); 214/
12; 218/13. There is no reference for the quo-
tation on page 61. “Hofstadter” is spelled
“Hofstaedter” throughout.
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Ward’s landmark book Dynamical cognitive science
provides a comprehensive introduction to the ap-
plication of dynamical systems theory in the field
of cognitive science, as well as an outstanding
synthesis of interdisciplinary theories and meth-
ods. Concepts and techniques of dynamical sys-
tems science are made available to cognitive scien-
tists, behavioral scientists and neuroscientists. The
book also presents important epistemological
views emphasizing the role of time and change—
the “unfolding in time”—in several scientific do-
mains.
Given the current scenario in cognitive sci-
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ence, Ward’s book explicitly and implicitly high-
lights an important alternative approach to cur-
rently unsolved problems in the field. One of these
core problems is the emergence of macroscopic
behavioral and cognitive states from microscopic
neural interactions, and from spatio-temporally
local input or internal states. An appropriate char-
acterization of macroscopic states in neuro-cogni-
tive systems in terms of dynamic systems can also
contribute to bridge the foundational gap between
subsymbolic and symbolic representational do-
mains. Another crucial problem in this framework,
which can be successfully approached in terms of
dynamic systems theory, is modeling the recipro-
cal interaction between neuro-cognitive systems
and their environment. In general, a dynamic sys-
tem approach is ideal to theorize and model
autonomous processing and representational dy-
namics “going beyond the stimulus given.”
In Dynamical cognitive science, Ward success-
fully makes relatively technical concepts or ana-
lytic tools understandable even to non-specialist
readers, without any loss of scientific rigor and
formal elegance. Despite the apparent heterogene-
ity of the relatively short yet dense 35 chapters,
their logical fluency and thematic integration are
remarkable. The unavoidable space limits are gen-
erally counteracted by an accurate selection of the
most relevant contents about the topic of each
chapter. The reader is appropriately referred to
other “dedicated” sources throughout the book.
Elegantly, Ward’s book starts with introduc-
ing the fundamental dynamic concepts of order,
rhythm and change, which are transposed from
the primordial domains of magic and rituals to
formal dynamics. The relevance of a dynamical
approach to behavior is convincingly introduced
with reference to psychophysical laws, and
specifically in discussing the limitations of
Steven’s law (Steven, 1975), neglecting both the
amount and the timing of fluctuations over trials,
as compared to Fechner’s approach (Fechner,
1860), using the amount of fluctuations to measure
sensation, and finally to a more comprehensive
dynamic approach also taking into account the
timing of fluctuations in stochastic and determinis-
tic processes (e.g. Kelso, 1995).
In Chapter 2, the serial nature of the universe
and human behavior (referring to Lashley’s prob-
lem of serial order in behavior), as well as the
Markovian analysis of behavior in terms of proba-
bilistic transitions depending only on the current
state, is introduced. In Chapter 3, the rhythmic
nature of interpersonal behavior, music and brain
activity is discussed. Haken et al.’s (1985) model
of coordination is presented as an example of
synergetics, the interdisciplinary theory of pattern
formation developed by Haken (1983). Different
concepts of time, space–time and time measure
are considered in Chapter 4, ending with an em-
phasis on discretized time in reformulating some
domains of physics and possibly quantum gravity.
These three chapters exemplify the interdisci-
plinary character of Ward’s book.
In one of the key chapters, Chapter 5, and
following the general conceptual analysis of time
in the previous chapter, time is considered with
reference to cognitive processes, in terms of
“temporal unfolding of cognitive behavior”
(p. 35). After having introduced the concept of
finite state machine (giving rise to sequences with
a different complexity), in this chapter Ward pre-
sents a variety of examples of time-variant psycho-
logical states, like emotional states evolving over
different time-scales, visual adaptation, scanning
by eye movements, learning and problem solving.
The temporal relationships between stimuli in vis-
ual masking and attention are also mentioned.
Finally, the constructive and dynamic (in terms of
network models) properties of memory are shortly
discussed. Perhaps, given the complexity of each
of these cognitive domains, more than one chapter
could have been dedicated to their temporal
properties.
Ward’s book may also be insightful if it is read
in an epistemological perspective. For instance, in
Chapters 6–10 the book introduces general ap-
proaches and concepts, with several epistemologi-
cal implications, like General Systems Theory,
Dynamical Systems Theory, the definition of for-
mal theory and the principle of complementarity.
Given the aims of Ward’s book, Chapter 8 appears
particularly important, as it puts forth the main
differences between dynamical models, concerned
with a succession of states, and statical models,
which implicitly or explicitly assume that the rel-
evant state of a system is constant. Appropriately,
Ward claims that “most theories and models in
psychology are statical models” (p. 62). Structural
models emphasizing the connectedness of elements,
with special reference to graph theory, as well as
their relationships to dynamic models, are dis-
cussed in Chapter 9. At a crucial point of the
book, Chapter 10 clearly defines deterministic and
stochastic models, concluding that these “two
types of models can lead to different outcomes
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even when applied to the same data,” and that
“useful models sometimes have both deterministic
and stochastic parts” (p. 87).
Given these premises and definitions, the
subsequent eleven chapters are concerned with
properties and models of stochastic processes. Al-
though some of these chapters do not directly refer
to cognitive or neural processes, they describe
concepts and analytic techniques that are funda-
mental in understanding other more cognitively-
or neurophysiologically-oriented chapters of the
book. One of these chapters (Chapter 13) is con-
cerned with stochastic models in physics, with the
crucial distinction between different description
levels (microscopic, mesoscopic and macro-
scopic).
Chapter 16 is focused on 1/f or “pink” noise,
a temporally structured noise supposed to rep-
resent the signature of a complex system (Wal-
drop, 1992) in human cognition. Several studies
on the role of 1/f noise in perception and behavior
(e.g. estimation of time intervals, reaction times)
are presented. Complementarily, Chapter 17 is on
1/f noise in the brain, in magnetoencephalo-
graphic, electroencephalographic and event-re-
lated potential recordings. Provocatively, on the
basis of several experimental findings, this chapter
concludes that brain activity is characterized by 1/f
noise at different levels, from neuronal currents to
macroscopic activity evoked by external stimuli.
However, as a reply to Ward’s claim, it may be
pointed out that much more neurophysiological
and neurocomputational evidence is necessary to
specify and constrain the neural mechanisms be-
hind these potentially crucial 1/f dynamics.
Given the evidence of 1/f noise in cognitive/
behavioral and neural processes, Ward considers
some models and the statistical theory of 1/f noise
in Chapters 18 and 19, respectively. Especially
interesting is self-organized criticality (Bak, 1990),
observed when a dissipative system with many
degrees of freedom operates near a point of insta-
bility (criticality) in non-equilibrium conditions,
without driving influences from the external (and
therefore by self-organization). The potential im-
plications of self-organized criticality for neural
computation with spiking neurons were also put
forth by Hopfield (1984), one of the pioneers of
neural network theory. Along with Haken’s syn-
ergetics mentioned in Chapter 3, self-organized
criticality may be considered as one of the most
versatile interdisciplinary theories in the dynamic
systems framework, with enormous implications
for the explanation of neural and cognitive
phenomena on different spatial and temporal
scales.
Another core concept in dynamic systems
theory, with important implications for neural and
cognitive modeling, is stochastic resonance, con-
sidered in Chapters 20–22. As explained by Ward,
stochastic resonance is a nonlinear cooperative
effect characterized by an amplification of weak
random signal fluctuations by an independent
weak (often periodic) signal. The relevance of
stochastic resonance is discussed in Chapter 21,
whereas Chapter 22 discusses the characterization
of single-neuron and neuronal network activity in
terms of stochastic resonance.
Finally, in Chapter 23 the concept of chaos is
introduced. In Chapter 24 the distinction between
chaos and randomness is clarified, and the logistic
difference equation introduced. Recently, in an
attempt to develop a neurocomputational archi-
tecture with multi-domain implications, Coupled
Map Lattices (Kaneko, 1990) governed by logistic
equations have been suggested to model several
perceptual and memory processes, in terms of
chaotic patterns of spatio-temporal coherence (Raf-
fone & van Leeuwen, 2001; van Leeuwen & Raf-
fone, 2001; van Leeuwen et al., 1997). Given the
computational efficiency in their implementation,
these models also appear promising in real world
applications, as in the segmentation of medical
images.
Chapter 25 clearly introduces and character-
izes nonlinear time series analysis, which can be
usefully applied in neuroscience and behavior
analysis (see Heath, 2001, for an encompassing
dedicated book). Chapters 26–30 interestingly re-
late the concepts and analytic tools presented in
the previous chapters to behavior and brain stud-
ies. In Chapter 27, for instance, the evidence of
chaos in the brain is discussed (see also Tsuda, in
press, for a recent theoretical synthesis about
chaotic patterns in brain function).
In Chapter 31, one of the most important of
the book for neural modeling implications, Ward
claims that relaxation oscillators, characterized by a
quick jump followed by a slow change over a
so-called “relaxation time,” may represent a foun-
dation for dynamical modeling. This view appears
consistent with the experimental evidence of cog-
nition-relevant oscillations and coherence in neu-
ral systems. Neural relaxation oscillations and syn-
chronization dynamics may play a crucial role in
binding local neural activities in the brain into
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larger representational units (see Singer, 1999, for
a review).
The last four chapters present synthetic
overviews on the evolution and ecology of cogni-
tion, dynamical cognitive neuroscience, dynamical
computation and dynamical consciousness. These
final chapters of the book clearly put forth the
broad implications of dynamical systems theory
and methods for different core domains of neural
and cognitive modeling.
However, it may be observed that Ward’s
book (mostly in Chapter 34) does not sufficiently
consider the connectionist approach to cognition
(e.g. Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986), which pro-
vided a first important dynamic approach to
neuro-cognitive information processing. Gener-
ally, it appears somewhat unclear to what extent
the current models based on dynamical systems
theory can explain and mechanistically simulate
the learning processes crucial to behavior and cog-
nition, as well as characterizing their neural corre-
lates. One of the exceptions in this scenario may
be represented by Tsuda’s (in press) brain theory
based on chaotic itinerancy.
A dynamical system approach, and more
specifically models based on networks of coupled
neural oscillators, is one of the best candidates to
solve the following high-level representational
problem in the brain: how do complex mental
processes and conscious awareness emerge from
microscopic interactions between neurons in the
brain? Several neuroanatomic and neurophysio-
logical studies demonstrated that neurons in the
cerebral cortex have access to limited fragments of
information from the external world. For instance,
neurons in the visual cortex are specialized in
processing some attributes or features of visual
stimuli, like specific orientations, colors or shapes.
However, despite this functional segregation in the
visual cortex, our perceptual experiences are inte-
grated and coherent, without any awareness of this
microscopic diversity and separate representations
in our brain.
The processing specialization in the cortex
leads to the crucial problem of integrating the
outputs (signals) from separate neural detectors or
processors, each of which encodes just a fragment
of the whole picture. In neuroscience and cogni-
tive science, this problem is commonly addressed
as the binding problem. The binding problem can
be generalized and thus include the integration of
signals from different brain regions. The following
passage from Adina Roskies (1999, p. 8) elo-
quently points out its broad implications:
How does something as simple and
mechanistic as neural firing add up to
subjectivity, raw feelings, a self? Are
the mechanisms that allow us to attri-
bute the correct color and shape to an
object the same ones that lead to the
unity of phenomenal experience? Will
the solution of the binding problem be
the solution to the mystery of con-
sciousness? (Roskies, 1999, p. 8)
As discussed in Ward’s book, it has been sug-
gested that the binding problem can be solved by
temporally-correlated firing of neurons coding for
different properties of a given stimulus (Singer,
1999; von der Malsburg, 1981), even during vis-
ual short-term storage after stimulus offset (Raf-
fone & Wolters, 2001). Chaotic neurodynamics
may be necessary to the self-organization of bind-
ing codes at different processing stages. For in-
stance, in simulation studies based on core dy-
namic systems principles, van Leeuwen and
Raffone (2001; see also Raffone & van Leeuwen,
2001) have recently demonstrated that chaotic
neural synchronization patterns are dynamically
flexible to represent efficiently complex visual
scenes or active memories in retrieval, even when
network units code for more than one active pat-
tern. However, many foundational and technical
questions about neural representations and cogni-
tive modeling remain to be answered, and proba-
bly only the combination and integration of dy-
namic system and connectionist methods will
provide the necessary answers in the future.
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Central to the debates over consciousness these
days is the question of whether perceptual aware-
ness can be accounted for solely in terms of the
representational content of perceptual states. Rep-
resentationalists like Michael Thau answer this
question in the affirmative. The view of the so-
called “qualia freaks” is that what it’s like to have
experiences outruns their representational con-
tent. Qualia freaks like Block take inverted spec-
trum scenarios to be evidence for their views.
Consequently, many representationalists such as
Dretske, Harman, Lycan, and Tye spend time
trying to show that these cases are impossible as
described by the qualia freak. Consciousness and
cognition occupies a middle ground in that it
makes room for spectrum inversion within a repre-
sentationalist account of perceptual awareness. In
that regard, Thau’s work is indebted to Sydney
Shoemaker’s, in spirit if not in its details.
In inverted spectrum cases, two subjects are
supposed to be alike with respect to the colors that
they perceive objects to have, but systematically
differ with respect to what it is like for them to
perceive objects as having colors. Subject S per-
ceptually represents objects to be red and green,
and what it is like for S to do so is R and G, while
what it is like for S* to perceive red and green,
respectively, is G and R, an inverted version of
what it is like for S. Neither subject misrepresents
the colors of objects, and since those colors are all
that is represented in such perceptual episodes the
differences between S and S* with respect to R
and G must be non-representational. Therefore,
the argument goes, there are aspects of conscious
awareness that cannot be explicated in terms of
the representational content of perceptual states
and representationalism is thus false.
One of Shoemaker’s ideas is that the repre-
sentation of redness, squareness, and the like does
not contribute to the phenomenal character or the
“what it’s like” of experiences. Other perceptually
represented properties that are correlated with
redness, etc. determine what it is like to have those
experiences. Thau agrees, but unlike Shoemaker,
he claims that the paradigmatically perceptible
properties like redness, squareness, distance,
brightness, loudness, pitch, smells and the like are
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not perceptually represented at all, and he uses a
variant of Jackson’s knowledge argument to estab-
lish this negative claim. Briefly reviewing the argu-
ment is a useful way of getting a feel for the book
as a whole.
Imagine Mary in her black-and-white room
being shown a red object for the first time without
being told that the object is red. Upon seeing it
she wonders, “Do fire engines have that prop-
erty?” She is then told that the object is red, and
exclaims, “So fire engines have that property!”
despite having known all along, we can assume,
that fire engines are red. Thau believes that the
property Mary ostends—that property—cannot be
redness and thus that Mary does not perceptually
represent the object as being red. The following
seems to be an accurate reconstruction of his
argument:
(1) Mary gets new information when she is told
that the object she sees is red.
The evidence for this claim is the fact that she
can wonder, before being told that the object is
red, whether fire engines have that property. Being
told that the object is red answers her question, so
it must constitute some new information.
(2) Whenever someone gets new information in
virtue of accepting some sentence, she also
gains a belief that differs from any of her old
beliefs with respect to its what.
This is what Thau calls the New Information
Principle, which is central to his defense of a pure
Millian approach to mental representation in
Chapter 3. Beliefs differ with respect to their what
just in case they differ in what they are about, as
opposed to differing in how they are about it. For
Thau, this is the only respect in which beliefs qua
beliefs can differ from one another. Thau inciden-
tally thinks that even if his arguments in favor of
pure Millianism are not decisive, the New Infor-
mation Principle stands and allows this argument
about Mary to go through (pp. 185–187). If Thau
is right of course, then his book hangs together
much more loosely than one would have hoped.
We are given an argument for pure Millianism and
a relatively independent argument about the na-
ture of perceptual states vis-a`-vis the beliefs to
which they give rise. Leaving that point aside, the
argument continues:
(3) Thus, Mary’s exclamation registers a new
belief.
Registering a new belief is not tantamount to ex-
pressing a new belief, and Chapter 4 is a nice
discussion of the semantic value of sentences and
the information that they are used to convey vis-a`-
vis Grice’s work on implicature. One can register a
new belief without expressing it directly, and the
issue is whether her exclamation registers such a
belief, and if so, what the belief amounts to.
(4) Thus, this new belief differs from her belief
that fire engines are red with respect to its
what.
(5) If redness  that property, then the differ-
ence between her new belief and the belief
that fire engines are red must be wholly
explicable in terms of some descriptive
mode of presentation that Mary did not
previously associate with the term “red.”
In order for the newly registered belief to differ in
its what from the belief that fire engines are red, it
must do so by associating with “that property”
some description that picks it out that is distinct
from any other description Mary previously asso-
ciated with “red.” Otherwise, one could find a
belief of hers that is identical with respect to its
what and thus identical tout court to the belief that
she has registered. Remember that on Thau’s ac-
count if that property  redness, then the belief
expressed by Mary—“Fire engines have that prop-
erty”—just is the belief that fire engines are red,
though the belief registered by the former may be
distinct from that registered by the latter. Moving
on, Thau thinks that the consequent of the forego-
ing conditional is false:
(6) The difference between the beliefs is not
wholly explicable in terms of some descrip-
tive mode of presentation that Mary did
not previously associate with the term
“red.”
The problem, as Thau sees it, is that there are very
few candidate descriptions to fill the role required
of them if we are to take redness to be identical to
that property. He says, “the new belief … will have
to be something like the belief that fire engines have
the intrinsic surface property of the thing she’s seeing,”
and that no “such belief can fully account for the
content of the new belief that she registers …”
(p. 192) Why not? On this point Thau is uncon-
vincing, though making the case for this premise
requires reworking the thought experiment yet
again, a discussion of which would be beyond the
scope of this review. It is essential that Thau be
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very convincing here, however, given the implausi-
bility of the consequences of the argument, which
are discussed below. Finally,
(7) Thus, redness is not identical to that prop-
erty.
The use of redness in the above argument is arbi-
trary, so the argument applies mutatis mutandis to
all of the standard cases of perceptible properties
like more determinate shades of color (e.g. crim-
son), pitch, loudness, saltiness, and sweetness
(p. 193): none of them are perceptually repre-
sented. Corresponding to those properties, how-
ever, are other properties or sets thereof that are
perceptually represented, like that property, for ex-
ample. What are these perceptually represented
properties? The positive account that accompanies
this negative claim is not articulated in enough
detail to be satisfying, but in broad outline it
proceeds as follows.
Given that colors are not perceptually repre-
sented, perceivers could be alike in their perceptu-
ally formed beliefs about the colors of objects
while differing with respect to the properties they
perceptually represent objects as having. So, the
story goes, spectrum inversion is possible even
though there is nothing more to perceptual aware-
ness than the contents of representational states.
Moreover, perceptual representation of properties
is internally determined, whereas representation of
properties like redness, squareness and the like is
externally determined. This accommodates
Thau’s strong intuition that “everything about the
way things visually seem is plausibly internally
determined. Contrary to what some have claimed,
I find it very hard to imagine that there could be
any phenomenological difference between your
physical duplicate and you” (p. 237). Thau be-
lieves, in addition, that there are good reasons for
thinking that the content of perceptual beliefs
about the colors, for example, is externally deter-
mined. His account therefore accommodates both
the internalist intuitions about experience and the
externalist intuitions about the contents of beliefs.
Now, in virtue of how their representation is
internally determined, the perceptually repre-
sented properties are not nameable with public
language predicates. What it is for these properties
to be represented is for one to have a perceptual
episode with them as their content, and the only
sense in which one can think about them is by
ostending them—“that property”—while one un-
dergoes such a perceptual episode. It is essential to
Thau’s approach that the perceptually represented
properties are unnameable, because if they were
then one could substitute them into the argument
we just reviewed and get the result that they are
not perceptually represented just like colors,
sounds, and smells (p. 223). Alternatively, of
course, this requirement on unnameability sug-
gests that there is a problem with Thau’s argu-
ment.
Thau is quite clear that perceptual represen-
tations, like beliefs, are truth-apt, notwithstanding
the fact that their contents are internally deter-
mined. He never mentions whether perceptual
representations are generally veridical, however,
and he never tells us what these perceptually rep-
resented properties are supposed to be. If they can
be properties of the objects that seem to have
them, then why can we only pick them out by
having perceptual episodes with them as their con-
tents? And if we can pick out those properties by
some other means, then why can we not name
them as we name properties such as redness?
These are fundamental questions about Thau’s
view that his book leaves unanswered. It is also
curious that whenever Thau tries to characterize
the perceptually represented properties that corre-
spond to the colors, they sound a lot like the colors
themselves. For example (pp. 34–35), he says that
they are the properties in virtue of which objects
are intrinsically related to one another in much the
same way that we judge the colors of objects to be
intrinsically related to one another.
As mentioned above, one of Thau’s motiva-
tions is the intuition that spectrum inversion is
possible, which he traces to the intuition that the
contents of perceptual representations are intern-
ally determined. Without a positive characteriza-
tion of the perceptually represented properties,
however, he has failed to establish the possibility
of spectrum inversion. Inversion scenarios are
those in which neither subject misrepresents the
perceived objects even though their experiences of
those objects differ in some significant respect.
Shoemaker’s view, from which Thau draws inspi-
ration, is interesting because subjects can be in-
verted even though no one misrepresents anything
and all that anyone is aware of is the content of
mental states. Thau’s view should do at least this
much, but it seems as though for Thau inversion
may be possible only at the price of misrepresen-
tation. Subjects can be alike in judging green ob-
jects to be green, and yet differ in the correspond-
ing properties that they perceptually represent
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green objects to have. But without knowing what
those perceptually represented properties are it is
impossible to know whether subjects can differ in
this way without at least one of them perceptually
misrepresenting green objects.
On the whole, this book is an interesting
attempt to work out what the most plausible rep-
resentationalist account of consciousness and cog-
nition should look like. For Thau this involves a
pure Millian account of mental representation
coupled with some radical claims about perceptual
representation. His version of the knowledge argu-
ment leads Thau to these claims, but absent a
more fleshed out positive account of the nature of
perceptually represented properties it is difficult to
find his arguments convincing. On a more positive
note, it is refreshing to see a new approach to the
problems raised by spectrum inversion and the
knowledge argument especially vis-a`-vis the de-
bates between Millians and Fregeans. The best
way to find out whether the problems of con-
sciousness are really a subset of the problems of
mental representation is to develop a careful and
fine-grained understanding of mental representa-
tion. Despite its limitations, Consciousness and cog-
nition is an interesting contribution to that project.
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In his Duality of the mind, Ron Sun moves beyond
the technical details of his work on human skill
learning to develop a broad framework for study-
ing human cognition. This background in skill
learning is evident in his general approach to cog-
nition. Sun’s starting point is that cognition ought
to be understood as emerging in its natural, daily
context: human activity. Given this basis, Sun asks
what the essential features of cognition thus con-
ceived are, and how to capture these in computa-
tional terms. He lists first four behavioral charac-
teristics:
(1) reactivity: a lot of human behavior consists
of immediate and fixed responses to en-
vironmental features that do not require to
be recomputed every time;
(2) sequentiality: human activities tend to con-
sist of multiple steps that are temporally
strung together;
(3) routineness: human activities often consist of
habitual sequences of behavioral responses;
and
(4) trial-and-error adaptation: learning reactive
routines is essentially a trial-and-error adap-
tation process.
Together, these characteristics form the basis for
learning skilled human activities that range from
habitualized reactive routines to high-level intel-
lectual skills. They also form the background
against which Sun sets his more specific ideas
concerning mind and cognition.
Most central in Sun’s view is the claim that
the mind is not a unitary system but consists of
two separate parts, an implicit knowledge system
and an explicit knowledge system. Differentiating
between implicit and explicit knowledge is com-
mon, and has popped up in many slightly different
guises such as procedural and declarative knowl-
edge, sub-conceptual and conceptual processing,
or non-conscious and conscious processing. How-
ever, Sun takes this distinction a step further.
According to Sun, findings from skill learning and
other data suggest strongly that there is a basic
and qualitative difference between a low-level,
connectionist system of procedural knowledge, the
workings of which remain inaccessible to con-
scious scrutiny, and a high-level classic symbol
processing system with consciously accessible
declarative knowledge. To repeat, the mind is
fundamentally a dual system.
Next to this central idea of the duality of
mind comes the claim that the lower, implicit
knowledge part is the primary one and that learn-
ing proceeds in a bottom up way. Sun opposes
studies in which learning is to a large extent top
down, and individuals learn first generic, verbal
declarative knowledge that is only subsequently
turned into specific procedural skills through prac-
tice. He holds that human skill learning ought not
to require a large amount of a priori knowledge but
is essentially based on bottom up derived implicit
knowledge to which high-level explicit knowledge
provides a later addition. The good thing of having
two qualitatively different components to the
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mind is that this provides the option of working
together in a synergistic way that generates better
overall results. Sun mentions a final important
characteristic of the mind—modularity. Within the
two major systems of implicit and explicit process-
ing, many other special purpose cognitive faculties
might arise according to need or as a result of
inborn tendencies.
Sun brings all these characteristics together in
his own dual model of cognition, called Clarion,
which consists of two levels. At the connectionist
bottom level, reinforcement learning takes place
that leads to the selection of appropriate actions
for any sensory input. In addition there is a top
level using classic symbols that executes a rule-
learning algorithm. If some action, decided on by
the bottom level, is successful, then the cognitive
system extracts a rule that corresponds to this
decision and adds the rule to the rule network.
When necessary, the rule is subsequently revised.
The top level is also capable of so-called plan
extraction where explicit sequences of action steps
are generated that do not require environmental
feedback. It is here that the Clarion system moves
beyond reactive actions that remain tied to the
current environmental states and becomes capable
of initiating and executing plans that require little
or no immediate sensory feedback. Sun provides
an elaborate appendix in which examples of the
Clarion architecture dealing with mazes and
minefield navigation are given. He also provides
an impressive collection of human data that can be
accounted for by simulations with his Clarion
architecture.
So far, all this sounds like good, solid AI.
Classic symbol processing and connectionist net-
works are brought together in a hybrid approach
that incorporates the good characteristics of two
different modeling techniques and also extends
these characteristics by their synergetic interac-
tion. However, Sun’s ambitions and views go be-
yond an interest in a particular cognitive architec-
ture as he links this architecture with more
general, theoretical issues, drawing inspiration
from philosophers and social scientists as Heideg-
ger, Merleau-Ponty, Vygotsky, and Bourdieu.
More specifically, he discusses Clarion in relation
to situated cognition, consciousness, and sociocul-
tural cognition. It is here that Clarion acquires a
much more general meaning that goes beyond the
architecture itself. However, this is also the place
where Sun’s story is sometimes less convincing.
Sun’s discussion of symbol grounding and
situated cognition deserves scrutiny in this respect.
Symbol grounding is a well-known problem for
AI. How are the symbols and representations used
within an artificially intelligent system to be con-
nected to the world outside, other then through an
ultimately arbitrary interpretation by the model
builder herself? A solution to this problem has
been found by connecting symbols to sensory-mo-
tor processes and so giving the system its own
interface with the external world. Its internal sym-
bols then ought to reflect the external world in a
non-arbitrary way. Sun develops this solution by
stressing the importance, and the primacy of ev-
eryday activities. From Heidegger and Merleau-
Ponty, he derives the idea that our existence in the
world is fundamental, “That ‘mindless’ everyday
activities, or coping with the world … is the basis
of high-level conceptual thinking and intentional-
ity” (p. 141). Sun uses the term “comportment”
for this behavioral basis of everyday reactive and
routinized activities that are direct and unmedi-
ated by high-level conceptual thinking.
“Comportment” consists of a structural two-way
connection, a pattern, between an agent and its
environment. According to Sun, comportment
constitutes the foundation of the cognition of
agents. At this point, Sun explicitly moves away
from standard views in artificial intelligence where
internal knowledge is foundational, and places
himself in the camp of situated cognition that
stresses the environmental and bodily embedded-
ness of cognition.
Sun’s embrace of situated cognition does not
lead to downplaying the importance of representa-
tions in cognitive explanation as often occurs in
this context. Comportment may be the foundation
of mind, but it is not the whole structure. Sun
identifies comportment with the bottom level of
his Clarion model and stresses that symbolic
thought occurs at the top level of Clarion as a
different kind of processing. The top level builds
upon and extends the reactive and routine activi-
ties of the connectionist bottom level with deliber-
ate symbolic thought, while Sun also stresses the
different processing capabilities of both levels. He
views the mind as a hybrid, dual entity.
At this point one may want to criticize the
move toward a dual and bottom up view of the
mind. This is also the kind of criticism Sun seems
to expect, and provides arguments and data
against. On the other hand, one may as well ask
whether Sun’s move is going far enough. He
claims that his model is in line with the general
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ideas of situated cognition. However, there are
many differences. Situated cognition stresses the
importance of bodily and situational factors for
intelligent action. This must be taken literal, even
when it leads to almost impossible demands on
modeling. The specific motor and sensory charac-
teristics must be taken into account, and so must
the continuous reciprocal coupling between them,
the physical environmental characteristics, and the
timing constraints. Situated cognition stresses the
physical behavioral interaction between an agent
and its environment as the foundation of cogni-
tion. Sun agrees with this when he defends the
foundational role of comportment; however, it is
questionable whether the action selection mechan-
ism of Clarion can bear this conceptual burden.
While situated cognition (as well as comportment)
centers around the issue of how actions are consti-
tuted by organism–environment interactions, in
Clarion actions are no more than the result, or
output, of action selection mechanisms at the top
and bottom level. While situated cognition stresses
the continuous sensory feedback of behavioral
movements for cognitive functioning (e.g.
O’Regan & Noe¨, 2001), Sun’s Clarion only uses
such feedback for the learning of unidirectional
perception–action links. The discrepancy becomes
highly visual in the figures. There Clarion is de-
picted as a feedforward system with arrows going
into one direction. A situated approach will always
stress the presence of a circular setup and invoke
diagrams with arrows feeding back from the action
to the perception side.
To conclude, Sun is verbally much more rad-
ical than his computational model of the dual
mind warrants. While his conceptual story is
founded on comportment, his explicit model re-
mains firmly grounded in the skill learning litera-
ture and a relatively abstract, and classical, in-
terpretation of human action. Action remains a
matter of deciding what to do, rather than doing it.
From a situated perspective, Sun’s bottom level
doesn’t reach low enough to provide a foundation
for cognition.
This discrepancy between Sun’s claims about
the general implications of his dual view and the
limitations of the actual Clarion model can also be
witnessed in the other two general topics dealt
with by Sun, consciousness and social cognition.
In his chapter on consciousness, he evaluates a
large number of different cognitive models that,
among other things, try to deal with consciousness
by differentiating between two subsystems—just
like Sun’s own Clarion. He finds them all wanting
for various reasons, except for Clarion. His main
reason is that, in contrast to the other models
described, Clarion offers two distinct mechanisms
for the two levels that correspond to conscious
accessibility, or not, for the two levels. Explicit
symbol processes operating on localist representa-
tions at the top level provides a mechanism that
explains conscious access of this level, while the
distributed representations of the connectionist
networks at the bottom level explains why process-
ing at this level remain consciously inaccessible. It
is unclear why Sun thinks that the explicit symbol
processing in his Clarion model now suddenly
provides an account of consciousness, while this
has been one of the major difficulties in AI and
cognitive science since their inception. Granted,
Sun is at that point discussing access conscious-
ness, which does not require the phenomenal as-
pects of qualia, but only a capacity for verbal
report. However, he still ends with the claim that
“In Clarion, qualia are the result of the two-level
organization, as well as intricate structures in-
volved in various fine-grained modules” (p. 189).
Here, the book sounds more like a one-sided
advertisement for Clarion than an even-handed
discussion of the problems involved in conscious-
ness.
The chapter on social and cultural aspects of
cognition exhibits the same problem. Again there
is an overly positive treatment of Clarion, now as
a way of dealing with sociocultural factors. Clar-
ion’s bottom level is said to be capable of learning
implicit social roles in a bottom up way. In ad-
dition, Clarion’s top level provides also a way to
assimilate explicit external knowledge within a so-
cial context, which can subsequently influence the
bottom level in a top down fashion. Well, it may
be possible to interpret Clarion in this suggestive
and interesting way, but the symbol grounding
problem will inevitably come banging on the door
again. Clarion so far remains a very simple system
that is not literally grounded in comportment—
being involved in real, situated actions—and cer-
tainly not partaking in a social world. There re-
mains a wide gap between Sun’s philosophical
story of comportment and the actual model.
Sun’s pushing of the Clarion model may be
overdoing it, but all in all this should not distract
one from the many good things that must be said
about the book. Sun’s philosophical story places
cognition firmly in the natural context from which
it arises: human activity. His basic division of the
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mind in two different parts is a plausible way of
dealing with empirical data that do not conform to
the age-old conception of the mind as a unitary
entity, his attention for sociocultural factors in
cognition is laudable, and many of his more de-
tailed observations and discussions are insightful
and important. Next to this, the discussion of his
Clarion model provides a good view of the state of
computational work on cognition. That the philo-
sophical and the model component of the book
remain a duality is a blemish, but at least one that
remains fully within the spirit of the Duality of the
mind.
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